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COMMENT: FOREIGN WORKFORCE AND BANK 
REFORM: CHANGING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LEVELS IN CHINA 
Michael Chan 
I. Introduction  
Corporate governance is a problem in China. By attracting capital 
and increasing exports, China has enjoyed positive economic growth in 
recent history.1 These positive economic indicators, however, have 
continued to grow despite China's lack of focus on corporate governance 
issues.2 Chinese enterprises, whether State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 
privately held companies, or companies owned by both the state and other 
private entities, have little short-term incentive to be financially 
transparent.3  These entities largely receive operational funds in both the 
equity and debt markets regardless of financial transparency levels.4  
Economic growth, however, will not continue without corporate 
governance reform. This note provides a brief discussion of Chinese 
economic history, outlines the issues surrounding China 's corporate 
governance problems, and finally articulates a two-tiered corporate 
governance solution based on economic reform in a bank-centric economy 
and human resource allocation utilizing foreign and local workforces.  
 
                                                 
1 See UNCTAD On-Line Handbook of Statistics, at http://www.unctad.org (Nov. 2, 
2003). 
2 See John H. Farrar, The New Financial Architecture and Effective Corporate 
Governance, 33 INT'L LAW. 927, 944 (1999). 
3 See Yuwa Wei, Seeking a Practicable Chinese Model of Corporate Governance, 10 
MSU-DCL J. INT'L L . 393, 399 (2001). 
4 Todd Kennith Ramey, China: Socialism Embraces Capitalism? An Oxymoron for the 
Turn of the Century: A Study of the Restructuring of the Securities Markets and Banking 
Industry in the People's Republic of China in an Effort to Increase Investment Capital, 20 
HOUS. J. INT'L L . 451, 467 (1998); See also Jianbo Lou, China's Bank Non-Performing 
Loan Problem: Seriousness and Causes, 34 INT'L LAW. 1147, 1148 (2000). 
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II. Corporate Governance Problems  
A. Foreign Direct Investment  
China cannot sustain positive foreign direct investment (FDI) 
growth if economic reforms to increase corporate governance levels do not 
improve. FDI is important to any developing country because it represents 
direct, long-term, non-passive investment in the economy from both 
individuals and business entities. China has enjoyed positive FDI growth 
in its industries despite inadequate financial disclosure. Total FDI in China 
grew from approximately US$12 billion during 1979-1982 to 
approximately US$37 billion by the end of 1993.5  China 's FDI consists 
of FDI inflows and outflows.6  FDI inflows alone in China reached US$40 
billion and US$46 billion in 2000 and 2001 respectively.7  China is 
currently one of the world's leading beneficiaries of FDI.8  In order to 
continue FDI growth, China should initiate economic reforms and 
implement human resource solutions to carry out a comprehensive plan.  
B. China is Bank-Centric  
1. Equity Markets: Not the Main Capital Source  
Chinese entities were once able to raise capital in their domestic 
stock markets and even in the United States equity markets.9  Capital 
inflows remained strong despite a lack of transparent financials that made 
valuations and earnings projections difficult, even for sophisticated 
                                                 
5 Todd Kennith Ramey, China: Socialism Embraces Capitalism? An Oxymoron for the 
Turn of the Century: A Study of the Restructuring of the Securities Markets and Banking 
Industry in the People's Republic of China in an Effort to Increase Investment Capital, 20 
HOUS. J. INT'L L . 451, 460 (1998). 
6 See Id. This note focuses on China's FDI inflows. 
7 UNCTAD On-Line Handbook of Statistics, supra note 1. 
8 Ramey, supra note 5. 
9 This article refers to the capital and equity markets synonymously. The capital markets 
consist of both stock and bond markets. This note, however, disregards the bond market 
because most entities are not in a position to successfully issue their own debt in China's 
current stage of economic development. In the bond market, entities can raise capital by 
issuing their own debt in the bond market, essentially finding investors that will “buy” 
their debt and effectively become their “lenders.” 
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institutional investors.10  The current economy no longer affords Chinese 
entities this luxury, yet there are exceptions. The entities that do use the 
equity markets, however, raise capital without providing transparent 
financial statements. When Chinese entities enlist on one of the major 
United States stock exchanges, financial reporting standards are relaxed 
due to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule changes in 1987 
that permit United States exchanges to waive or modify certain listing 
standards for foreign issuers in order to attract foreign companies to U.S. 
equity markets.11  Thus, Chinese entities still have managed to raise 
capital in the equity markets while providing relatively poor financial 
statements.  
This trend cannot continue if China wants the equity market to 
become the major vehicle for FDI. Despite positive FDI growth, the equity 
market is experiencing problems and requiring greater regulation that will 
ultimately demand greater reporting transparency among both state-owned 
and commercial Chinese entities.12  Although the capital markets will be 
essential for raising investment capital in the long-term, equity markets are 
at an early growth stage and currently represent a relatively small source 
of total capital to Chinese industries.13  Financial transparency and 
corporate governance must improve in order for Chinese entities to attract 
capital to the equity or stock markets in the long-term, and to raise capital 
in the debt market or from banks.  
 
                                                 
10 “Transparent financials” are financial statements such as income statements, balance 
sheets, and cash flow statements that accurately reflect an entity's financial position. 
11 Robert Todd Lang, Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and 
Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1515 (2002). 
12 Ramey, supra note 5. 
13 Id. at 459; Lawrence L. C. Lee, Integration of International Financial Regulatory 
Standards for the Chinese Economic Area: The Challenge for China, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan, 20 N.W. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 13 (1999). 
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2. Debt Markets  
While the equity or stock market may be the main source for 
capital in the long-term, Chinese entities now primarily turn to the debt 
markets.14  A bank-centric economy means that most Chinese entities raise 
capital in the Chinese banking sector, while few depend on raising capital 
in the United States or China capital markets.15  Therefore, if SOEs and 
commercial entities are to obtain necessary funding, they will need to 
implement a plan focusing on building a strong banking system that will 
force them to offer transparent financials and increase levels of corporate 
governance.  
C. Non-Performing Loans  
1. Bailout Cycles  
State Owned Enterprises are the main lending beneficiaries of a 
bank-centric economy and the primary contributors to China's non-
performing loan (NPL) problem.16  Banks continue to lend to SOEs 
knowing that the PRC will bail them out, artificially supporting otherwise 
failing companies.17  SOEs are not compelled to provide banks with 
accurate financial statements because funding largely continues, regardless 
of profitability or cash flow, at the direction of the People's Bank of China 
(PBOC).18  China's bank bailout cycles are central to the corporate 
governance problem. China should therefore focus on banking system 
                                                 
14 Jianbo Lou, China's Bank Non-Performing Loan Problem: Seriousness and Causes, 34 
INT'L LAW. 1147, 1159 (2000). 
15 Id. 
16 Michael E. Burke, IV, Improving China's Bank Regulation to Avoid the Asian Bank 
Contagion, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32, 86 (1999). 
17 See id. 
18 Lawrence L. C. Lee, Integration of International Financial Regulatory Standards for 
the Chinese Economic Area: The Challenge for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, 20 Nw. 
J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 12 (1999); The PBOC is the central bank of China since 1983 and 
the lender of last resort for state-run banks. 
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reform before stock market regulation to increase levels of corporate 
governance.  
Unfortunately, poor quality loan funding leads to highly leveraged 
enterprises that commonly result in default.19  Such NPLs or loans that do 
not generate sufficient revenue for the lender remain on the banks' balance 
sheets and are written off only at the direction of the PBOC.20 Estimates of 
NPL to total outstanding loan ratios among Chinese banks range from 
thirty to sixty percent, one of the highest NPL levels in Asia.21  Economic 
pressure to create assets through lending compels banks to fund poor 
quality loans. The pressure to create a larger asset base is due to relatively 
large amounts of bank deposits, which represent a liability on the balance 
sheet.22 
If a bank's loan portfolio cannot sustain the ratio of NPLs to 
performing loans, the PBOC will bail out banks as well.23  The entire 
banking system could break down if this cycle continues:  
The accumulation of NPLs has historically been one of the direct 
causes of bank failures. In the United States, loan losses dominated the 
major bank failures from 1934 to 1983. The recent bankruptcy of China's 
second largest international trust and investment corporation, Guangdong 
International Trust and Investment Corporation (GITIC), was more or less 
due to the large amount of unrecoverable loans…. [I]t would not be 
exaggerating to assert that if the creation of new NPLs cannot be 
                                                 
19 Lou, supra note 14, at 1162. 
20 Id. at 1148. 
21 Id. 
22 Essentially, China banks have relatively high deposit levels upon which they must pay 
depositors interest. Such deposits are bank liabilities. In turn, banks must fund loans to 
generate revenue in order to offset the interest paid on deposits. Such loans are bank 
assets. 
23 Lou, supra note 14, at 1151. 
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effectively curbed, the accumulating NPLs will eventually pull down the 
state commercial banks and even the entire banking system in China.24 
High NPL levels directly decrease bank profitability, lower 
consumer confidence, and decrease export growth and FDI.25  Most NPLs 
were created after the reform began, highlighting the deficiencies of the 
reform.26 
2. Monitoring and Enforcement  
Lack of effective monitoring and enforcement contribute to the 
NPL problem, hampering corporate governance.27  Reforms in the past 
have not succeeded in large part because of the lack of monitoring and 
enforcement regimes in place.28  China's current economic stage does not 
afford it a reputable external auditing authority. Thus, internal 
mechanisms within the banking sector will have to fulfill this function. It 
is realistic for banks to perform the financial auditing function. This point 
is later described.  
D. Qualified Financial Underwriters  
Obtaining the necessary personnel to successfully implement an 
effective economic plan is crucial.29  Furthermore, the widespread need for 
labor management apart from the banking industry has grown from the 
rising friction between Chinese partners and foreign investors in equity 
joint ventures.30  As equity joint ventures have grown, so has the conflict 
between the participants, caused by the diametrically opposed goals of a 
                                                 
24 Id. at 1150. 
25 Lou, supra note 14, at 1153. 
26 Lou, supra note 20. 
27 Zhongfei Zhou & Jingwei Li, In Search of Approaches to Improving Corporate 
Governance in China's State-Owned Commercial Banks, 36 INT'L LAW. 215, 217 (1992). 
28 Wei, supra note 2, at 414. 
29 See Margaret L. H. Png, Equity Joint Ventures in The People's Republic of China: 
Problems That Continue After More Than A Decade Under The Open Door Policy, 24 
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 589, 590 (1992). 
30 See id. at 589 (equity joint ventures provide a direct investment vehicle in which both 
Chinese partners and foreign investors can simultaneously participate). 
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planned economy versus the market economy. Friction between these joint 
venture partners involves three labor management areas: 1) recruitment; 2) 
dismissal; and 3) bureaucratic interference.31  The proposed solution 
addresses the practical problems of recruitment and retention. China's 
viewpoint that a foreign workforce may pose a threat to the Chinese 
culture or economic system is also a concern.  
III. Economic History  
A. Early Reform  
1. People's Bank of China  
Both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the People's Bank 
of China (PBOC) were founded in 1948.32  The PBOC was China's only 
bank, performing as a hybrid of a central bank and commercial bank.33 
The PBOC was under highly centralized control, and banks that were 
subsequently created performed passive roles similar to bookkeepers and 
cashiers.34  China's financial system was outmoded and fragile from a 
Western perspective, as all of China's banks were state-owned and 
undercapitalized.35  Further, many of the loans issued were NPLs to 
SOEs.36 
2. Specialized Banks  
In 1978, economic reforms and open-door policies were initiated.37  
The reformation of the PBOC into the Central Bank of China in 1983 
reflected these new reforms. The PBOC became the lender of last resort, 
                                                 
31 Png, supra note 29, at 612. 
32 Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Transforming China's Traditional Banking Systems Under the 
New National Banking Laws, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 479, 480 (1996). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 481. 
35 Lawrence L. C. Lee, Integration of International Financial Regulatory Standards for 
the Chinese Economic Area: The Challenge for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, 20 NW. 
J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 12 (1999). 
36 Id. 
37 Lan Cao, Chinese Privatization: Between Plan and Market, 63-FALL LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (2000). 
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an official central bank and statutory body answerable only to the National 
People's Congress (NPC), in an attempt to create a banking model similar 
to the United States' Federal Reserve System.38  Subsequent to the 
reformation of the PBOC, “the commercial lending business was separated 
from the PBOC and [was] transferred to newly created ‘specialized 
banks.'”39  China created four state-controlled commercial banks, or 
specialized banks in the mid 1980s: the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of 
China (BOC), and the People's Construction Bank of China (PCBC).40 
These specialized banks were labeled the “big four.”41  The organizational 
principle of the financial system at that time was “unified leadership and 
division of specialism. The overall financial system implement[ed] the 
unified policy, plan and system which [was] stipulated by the State. Each 
specialized bank [had] its special responsibility in its own field.”42 
B. Reform in the 1990s  
1. Policy Banks  
In the 1980s, China's banking system simply consisted of a central 
bank surrounded by specialized banks.43  Bank reform in the 1990s 
attempted to build an efficient and autonomous banking system through 
commercial banks.44  The Commercial Banking Law of the People's 
Republic of China states that commercial banks should be supervised by 
the central bank, and “should be operated under the principles of 
efficiency, safety and liquidity.”45  In 1994, China enacted three reforms to 
                                                 
38 Qian, supra note 32, at 481. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 482. 
41 Id. at 488. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. at 481. 
44 See Qian, supra note 32, at 482. 
45 Id. at 488. 
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work towards bank commercialization: 1) reform its foreign exchange 
control system; 2) open up banking industry to foreign participation, 
allowing foreign partners to invest in financial institutions; and 3) 
establish three policy banks, which provide “policy loans” that are usually 
non-performing and thus are often not creditworthy for funding under 
normal commercial bank standards.46 
This discussion will focus on the third option previously 
mentioned: the formation of policy banks, which are primarily responsible 
for non-commercial, state-initiated, non-performing loans. The three 
policy banks are: 1) the Import-Export Bank, which funds large state-
initiated trade deals; 2) the State Development Bank, which finances 
infrastructure developments; and 3) the Agricultural Development Bank of 
China, which finances agricultural procurement for rural development.47 
In an effort to convert specialized banks into commercial banks, policy 
banks release the specialized banks of their obligation to fund non-
performing policy loans typically used to finance SOEs and other 
government projects.48  Policy banks therefore permit specialized banks to 
concentrate on funding profitable commercial loans.49  Most specialized 
banks have yet to be converted into commercial banks.50  China may 
intend to convert the “big four” into commercial banks, yet this is not 
viable in the short to intermediate term.51 
Emergence of the three policy banks has, however, allowed 
commercial banks to form; in addition to the three policy banks and the 
                                                 
46 Id. at 484. 
47 Lawrence L. C. Lee, Integration of International Financial Regulatory Standards for 
the Chinese Economic Area: The Challenge for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, 20 NW. 
J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 13 (1999). 
48 See id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 For purposes of this note, short and intermediate term time frames are approximately 
five and fifteen years respectively. 
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“big four” specialized banks, ten commercial banks have formed as of 
1995.52  Positive growth may continue as commercial banks concentrate 
on profitable loans based on sound credit analysis.  
2. The Commercial Banking Law of the People's Republic of China  
The Commercial Banking Law of the People's Republic of China 
(CBL), enacted in 1995, is a core piece of legislation that governs the 
development of Chinese commercial banking.53  Commercial bank 
development is guided by three principles outlined in the Commercial 
Banking Law: efficiency, safety, and liquidity.54  The CBL notes that 
operations should be independent from any external interference and 
should rely on the following canons: 1) self-operation; 2) self-risk 
management; 3) self-responsibility for profits or losses; and 4) self-
restraint.55  The CBL is the main legal instrument that aids commercial 
bank formation.56 
IV. Analysis  
A. Interest Rate Reform  
Banks receive their allocated lending quotas based on the 
borrowing demands of their markets.57  Lending quotas are then balanced 
against the banks' deposits.58  The problem, however, is that deposit levels 
and lending demand do not always coincide. Banks that are deposit poor 
must receive aid from the PBOC to fund loans.59  However, banks are 
more often subjected to lending pressure based on relatively high levels of 
                                                 
52 Qian, supra note 32, at 484. 




57 William D. Holmes, China's Financial Reforms In The Global Market, 28 LAW & 
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 715, 720 (1997). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 721. 
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deposits in relation to loans outstanding.60  Thus, the PRC should permit 
the PBOC to give interest rate relief to banks with high deposit levels. 
This interest rate subsidy would allow depositors to earn interest at 
relatively higher rates, yet would allow banks to receive fund loans based 
on prudent credit analysis without undue pressure to make sub-par loans.  
Specifically, the PBOC should make partial interest payments to 
depositors in order to relieve liquidity pressures in banks and reduce 
vulnerability to market and credit risk. When banks receive deposits, they 
must in turn make interest payments to depositors. Banks are therefore 
under pressure to lend that same money out in order to create assets or 
loans that offset such liabilities or deposits. Banks should have a “safety 
net” only in regards to having large amounts of deposits. Chinese 
government subsidies would reward banks for holding deposits by 
relieving bank pressure to fund unnecessary low quality loans.61  This is 
an intermediate term solution that would be phased out in the long-term.  
B. Credit Autonomy with Central Bank Control  
This proposal emphasizes enforcement of Article 7 of the CBL, 
which is essential to increasing transparency levels among SOEs and 
commercial enterprises. Article 7 states, “When engaging in credit 
business, a commercial bank shall strictly examine the credibility of a 
borrower and persist in extending loans against collateral in order to 
ensure recalling loans on time.”62  Contrary to the theory that pure market 
forces should lead China out of its economic difficulties, China will 
                                                 
60 Id.  
61 In essence, such subsidies lower real interest rates that banks pay out to depositors. 
62 The Commercial Banking Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 7, 1995. 
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benefit by maintaining central control of banks through the PBOC, yet 
giving commercial banks the autonomy to underwrite loans.63 
Credit autonomy is key to commercial banking success. Nothing 
will replace funded loans based on sound credit analysis; however, in the 
event of non-performance, the collateral mentioned in Article 7 gives 
banks recourse.64  Commercial banks should have the right to receive 
compensation through this collateral in the event of default.65 
Although commercial banks would have credit analysis autonomy, 
bank management and establishment would be controlled by the PBOC as 
stated in Article 11 of the CBL: “The establishment of a commercial bank 
shall require the examination and approval of the People's Bank of 
China.”66  In addition to establishment, the PBOC should have central 
control over various aspects of operation. For instance, fund reserve 
requirements among specialized, commercial and policy banks would be 
determined by the PBOC.  
C. No Bailout Provision  
In addition to credit analysis autonomy, commercial banks must be 
allowed to fail. If the PBOC artificially supports otherwise failing banks, 
accounting transparency among its clients will not improve. A “no 
bailout” provision should be enacted in the CBL.67 The PBOC should set 
specific standards by which banks must abide in order to avoid 
compulsory shut down, thus providing banks an incentive to demand 
transparent financials from their clients.  
                                                 
63 The PBOC could still have macro-economic control over interest rates and other 
monetary policy, yet would provide an environment where commercial banks could build 
healthy loan portfolios. 
64 See supra note 62; Collateral against a loan provides a guarantee that helps mitigate the 
lender's risk in the event of default. 
65 Qian, supra note 32, at 489. 
66 The Commercial Banking Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 11, 1995. 
67 Chapter VII of the CBL offers provisions for takeover and termination, but does not 
expressly provide parameters for mandatory bank failure. 
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D. Emergence of Commercial Banks  
Some believe that the “big four” should be transformed into 
commercial banks.68  Commercial banks arising as the primary source of 
debt financing is a creditable long-term goal, but the “big four” specialized 
banks should not be transformed into commercial banks. Rather, new 
commercial banks that target a particular market niche should develop. 
Commercial banks should gradually take loan market share away from the 
“big four,” reducing their prominence in the market over time.  
E. Finding a Qualified Workforce  
A balance of bank credit analysis autonomy and central bank 
management control will provide the foundation for improved corporate 
governance. Economic mechanisms such as a “no bailout” provision and 
interest rate reform will allow the commercial bank industry will grow in a 
healthy manner, leading to higher corporate governance among SOEs. 
Implementing this economic plan, however, requires qualified personnel 
to manage and perform the financial underwriting. Although cultural 
barriers and the apprehension of hiring a foreign workforce exist, China 
has a long-term interest in considering the proposal.  
The proposed solution involves a combination of bank reform and 
human resource allocation. Recruiting personnel from a qualified local 
talent pool should be a long-term objective. Short and intermediate term 
solutions are to obtain a qualified workforce. The recruitment solution 
entails primarily hiring returnees. A secondary component of the solution 
includes recruiting expatriates, while fostering an environment where local 
workers can be hired and even trained within the long-term.  
 
 
                                                 
68 Qian, supra note 32, at 482. 
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1. General Recruiting Options  
China needs qualified financial underwriters and managers to 
initiate economic reform. Due in part to tremendous foreign investment 
growth over the last two decades, China has had difficulties hiring and 
retaining qualified employees.69  In addition, friction within joint equity 
ventures between Chinese partners and foreign investors increased as 
foreign investment grew.70  As equity joint ventures have grown, so have 
the conflicts between the participants, caused by the diametrically opposed 
goals of a planned economy versus the market economy.71  China's 
economic complexity as a large developing economy and cultural barriers 
to accepting a foreign workforce contribute to this friction.72 
Recruiting qualified professionals poses entirely different problems 
from hiring low-cost, unskilled labor. China needs financial underwriters 
at all levels, including executive management. The major challenges for 
the PRC lie in finding qualified local talent, especially at managerial 
levels, and in cultural assimilation for a newly hired foreign workforce, 
particularly expatriates. Three general recruiting options are available: 1) 
hire local workers and college graduates and provide on-the-job training; 
2) hire “returnees”; and 3) hire expatriates.73  Returnees are local residents 
who have studied and/or worked abroad who want to return to China.74 
Expatriates are generally described as non-Chinese persons from the West 
                                                 
69 Ames Gross, Recruiting Professionals in Southeast Asia, 7 SUM INT'L HR J. 16 (1998). 
(Publication page references are not available for this document.) 
70 See Png, supra note 29, at 589. Joint equity ventures are enterprises owned jointly by 
Chinese partners and foreign investors. 
71 Png, supra note 29, at 589. 
72 Mao-Chang Li, Legal Aspects of Labor Relations in China: Critical Issues for 
International Investors, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 525 (1995). 
73 See Gross, supra note 69; Ames Gross, Strategies for Successfully Recruiting Staff for 
China, 5 FALL INT'L HR J. 41 (1996). (Publication page references are not available for 
this document.) 
74 See Gross, supra note 69. 
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who work in China.75  The proposed recruiting and retention solution 
implements variations of all three options.  
2. Local Recruiting  
Hiring local workers is not entirely viable in the short-term 
because the pool of qualified skilled local workers is too small.76  
Alternatively, companies may provide their employees with on-the-job 
training to the relatively select few who display potential as financial 
underwriters and managers. The drawback of such training, however, is 
that once training is received, employees may switch to higher paying jobs 
at other companies.  In th77e past, poaching, or recruiting from other 
regions that effectively “steal” employees away from a particular country, 
has caused 20 to 30 percent annual employee turnover in Thailand's 
finance and banking industry.78  China, however, can mitigate this risk by 
implementing various employment programs to reduce turnover.79  Long-
term employment contracts can be signed, but other benefit plans may be 
more effective.80  For example, retirement benefit plans that are at least 
partially company funded and vest after a certain period of time may 
provide an incentive for workers to stay with their current employer.81 
3. Returnees and Expatriates  
Returnee and expatriate recruiting may offer China more highly 
qualified skilled workers than local recruiting in the short-term, making a 
combination of all three human resource options a practical solution for 
                                                 
75 Id. For purposes of this note, expatriates include Overseas Chinese who are hired to 
work in the PRC. Overseas Chinese are ethnic Chinese who were born outside of, and 




79 Ames Gross, Strategies for Successfully Recruiting Staff for China, 5 FALL INT'L HR J. 
41 (1996). (Publication page references are not available for this document.) 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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the PRC. Hiring returnees or locals who have studied and/or worked 
abroad and want to return to China, is another way to find qualified 
candidates. Returnees may be more qualified than some of the local 
workforce, while providing other advantages distinct to their group 
classification. Unlike the majority of expatriates, returnees speak the local 
language, tend to present less housing problems, and have fewer 
difficulties meeting visa requirements.82  In addition, returnees who 
studied in Hong Kong could arguably provide the strongest immediate 
contribution as high quality candidates that could most easily assimilate to 
China's culture. Hong Kong is regarded as foreign to the PRC.  
Returnees, however, may have potential conflicts with local staff 
over status issues.83  This problem is inapplicable to expatriates. Local 
employees and returnees may compare and evaluate each other in a 
manner that expatriates would not be subject to because they are not ethnic 
Chinese.84  In addition, expatriates may have managerial skills that 
returnees who have recently graduated from academia may not have.85  
Both returnees and expatriates may be more expensive and often demand 
more benefits than local workers.86  Similar to returnees, expatriate costs 
for recruitment and retention compared with local workers is significantly 
higher in terms of salary and other possible costs.87  Additional costs may 
include expenses for cars, drivers, maids, club memberships, taxes and 
placing their children in expensive international schools.88 Weighing all 
factors, returnees are more desirable than expatriates.  
 
                                                 
82 See Gross, supra note 69. 
83 Id. See Gross, supra note 79. 
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4. Professional Foreign Recruiting  
In fact, the financial premium that China could pay should extend 
to projects that actively recruit Chinese students, particularly in the United 
States. Such a proposed project can be compared to Indonesia 's home 
placement program at Northeastern University in Boston called “Home 
Country Placement.”89  Over 100 major U.S. and Indonesian companies 
make daily requests to this center, matching inquiries with student 
profiles, allowing Indonesian students in the U.S. to find employment in 
their home country.90  Adopting a similar program in China would allow 
the PRC to recruit among a pool of qualified graduates. In addition, 
traditional search firms can be effective in finding mid to upper level 
executives whether they are returnees or expatriates.91 
Taxes also influence foreign recruiting. To encourage short-term 
expatriate hiring, China should not levy taxes on these foreign workers or 
the companies that hire them, a practice that other countries like Malaysia 
and Indonesia follow.92  Such taxes should be unnecessary in the long run 
because market forces alone should discourage companies from hiring too 
many expatriates.  
5. Cultural Challenges  
It is in China's long-term economic interest to accept a foreign 
workforce despite personality differences and possible perceived cultural 
threats. The economic advantages to foreign recruitment outweigh the 
cultural disadvantages. To some extent, it can be argued that financial 
skills required for commercial bank underwriting transcends cultural 
barriers. Further, proper credit analysis does not involve political 
influence. In addition, local employees have much to learn from foreign 
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workers. Returnees who studied in the U.S. may be familiar with both 
Chinese and Western cultures and could provide an immediate 
contribution.  
Despite the advantage of multiculturalism, China may perceive 
such employees as a cultural threat. China may fear that returnees and 
expatriates would impose their views on labor rights, and assert rights to 
assemble and form unions. This is a legitimate concern, but economic 
demand for such workers supercede these obstacles. The reality is that 
local employees have much to learn from foreign workers in this 
specialized field.  
China ought to refrain from implementing government regulations 
stipulating that foreign workers may fill a skilled position only if there is 
no comparably qualified local worker. Such legal provisions exist in 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.93  In a period during 
which highly qualified workers are needed, China should be able to hire 
well-qualified returnees rather than merely competent local workers. 
Implementing such regulations may cause locals to view that foreigners 
are taking their jobs. Again, economic necessity supercedes this concern.  
6. Long Term Educational Investment: Key to Local Workforce  
pects of local recruiting should be a major focus for China in the 
banking sector. Heavy educational investment in China should mirror 
some of the successful efforts in Southeast Asia to combat the shortage of 
educated workers in that region.94  For instance, the Indonesian 
government has received large World Bank loans to increase its 
educational facilities.95  One loan for $164 million was granted to finance 
education projects funding junior secondary education and to improve the 
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quality and efficiency of Indonesian high schools and universities.96 
Thailand has invested $415 million for a skills development plan to train 
1.9 million workers and 24,390 instructors and to construct labor 
development centers nationwide.97  In addition, Thailand has eased the 
requirements for establishing a private high school or university, only 
requiring that 80 percent of the students be Thai and that English be a 
mandatory language.98 Long-term educational funding has been successful 
in various other Asian regions, which suggests that funding in China could 
be similarly successful.  
Part of China's educational investment should include extending 
scholarships to students in various technical fields involving financial 
underwriting. A similar scholarship program has been administered in the 
Philippines, where that country's Department of Science and Technology 
offered 3,500 scholarships to Master's degree candidates in the fields of 
science and mathematics.99 
It is difficult to determine the long-term economic success of 
certain projects, but quantifiable results are available. For example, in 
Malaysia, the number of first degree candidates increased from 15,000 to 
75,000 between 1975 and 1993.100  Progress monitoring challenges should 
not, however, deter China from a long-term investment in building a major 
quality education program. Economic complexity is greater in China's 
large economy. Financial risks of long-term educational investment are 
higher than in smaller economies, but opportunity costs for not 
implementing an educational plan are even greater.  
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V. The Solution  
Long-term objectives are addressed, yet short-term and 
intermediate term goals are mainly discussed. Thus, stock markets may be 
a primary capital source in the long-term, but economic reform involving 
the debt market is the key to improving corporate governance over the 
next fifteen years. Further, the greatest source of human capital should 
ultimately derive from local Chinese sources, yet short and intermediate 
solutions primarily involve recruiting and retaining a qualified foreign 
workforce.  
Economically, China should focus on building a sufficient banking 
system rather than its capital markets to improve corporate governance; 
this however, is not a new idea.101  Further, economic reform to regulate 
state enterprises through market forces and incentives instead of 
inefficient central planning has been a common mantra as well.102  What is 
novel is that the proposal allows the PBOC to maintain centralized control 
over the banking industry while giving banks complete autonomy to 
perform credit analysis and build their loan portfolios. For example, the 
PBOC can subsidize interest rate payments to depositors in order to 
provide interest rate relief to banks, while still allowing them to perform 
credit analysis with complete autonomy. Also novel is the idea that 
commercial monitoring problems can be resolved through bank demand 
for financial transparency among its corporate clients. Monitoring would 
take place as banks periodically analyze company financials during an 
ongoing relationship with clients that maintain loans. Thus, there is no 
immediate need for a third party to monitor or enforce corporate 
governance activities within companies. Further, the PRC would let banks 
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fail when loan portfolios could not sustain liabilities. Thus, company 
enforcement to become transparent would not be a large issue. The risk of 
bank failure compels entities to provide solid financial statements in order 
to obtain and retain debt funding. Indeed, banks would no longer be able 
to fund non-performing loans if they are allowed to fail. In turn, entities 
would be permitted to fail under a “no bailout” provision in the CBL, 
providing proper incentive to report accurate financial statements. Thus, 
companies could not continue to obtain loans without being fully 
financially transparent.  
Recruiting and retaining qualified financial underwriters and 
managers are among China's largest challenges. A qualified workforce is 
necessary to implement complex financial underwriting. A short-term 
primary goal of recruiting returnees with a secondary aim to employ 
expatriates, and a long-term focus on cultivating a qualified local 
workforce will fulfill China's human resource demands. Cultural 
differences between local and foreign workers are not ignored. Financial 
cost and complexity of building an educational program are also 
recognized. Despite cultural and economic challenges, China has the long-
term economic incentive to implement a foreign workforce.  
VI. Conclusion  
Attracting foreign capital is necessary for China's continued 
economic growth. A major obstacle, however, is the lack of corporate 
governance and accounting transparency in the PRC. China has had many 
problems with the efficiency and effectiveness of its financial 
regulation.103  Many proponents advocate a market discipline to allow the 
free markets to solve China's financial woes.104  However, allowing 
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market forces to operate freely is too drastic and unrealistic in the PRC. 
The economic proposal is pragmatic. Additionally, recruiting highly 
qualified underwriters from outside the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
to perform complex, in-depth credit analysis, is a key component in 
developing a comprehensive solution that allows commercial banks to 
perform their own independent credit analysis while still maintaining 
macro-economic control over the banking industry.  
China is a developing country with tremendous societal and 
economic potential. Government control, financial autonomy, and a 
collaboration of human resources from neighboring regions and other 
countries may help China solve their corporate governance problems.  
